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Today’s aerospace industry is faced not only with the challenges of developing spacecraft 
and supporting technologies to explore the unknown, but they must do so successfully with 
tighter budgets and fewer personnel.  Mission failure causes publicity that the industry cannot 
afford in this economy.  To maintain project schedules and prevent budget overruns, problems in 
the spacecraft system design must be found early in the development stages.  An approach to 
using existing system design visualizations to aid system verification and validation in the early 
design stages is described.  These commonly used system design visualizations are used to create 
and intent specification in a systems engineering development environment known as SpecTRM.  
The intent specification is executable and analyzable, allowing system design flaws and 
requirements problems to be determined prior to any hardware or coding development.  An 
example of the utilization of these system design visualizations to create an intent specification is 
applied to the mobility and positioning system (MAPS) of a robot designed to process thermal 
tiles on the space shuttle. 
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The challenges in the aerospace industry today are no longer just to push the scientific 
barrier and develop new technologies while successfully completing space exploration missions.  
Dramatic budget cuts and lack of political and public support have forced the aerospace industry 
to change the type of spacecraft and systems that are designed and built.  The aerospace projects 
that are now best known to the general public are those that fail before even attempting their 
exploratory goals.  To continue to receive funding for aerospace technology research and space 
exploration, NASA and other industry leaders must produce spacecraft that can complete 
successful missions. 
Investigation board reports from recent aerospace mission failures show that insufficient 
or not properly documented requirements and specifications are a leading cause for mission 
failure.  Errors in this stage of system development are far cheaper to correct and take less time 
away from the development schedule, provided they are detected while still in the design 
process.  This chapter outlines the history of these types of system failures and the problems 
engineers are faced with in the aerospace industry to lead the way for the systems engineering 
approach discussed in this thesis. 
 
1.1 Complex Systems in the Aerospace Industry 
 
Spacecraft and other aerospace projects are excellent examples of complex systems.  
Humans and computers work together to design, develop, build and operate these complex 
systems to achieve system goals.  As the systems in the aerospace industry grow in complexity, a 
change is needed in the approach to system design.  Most of the recent aerospace accidents can 
be attributed to errors made in requirements and specifications during the system design and 
development phase.  In just one year three different NASA missions (Mars Climate Orbiter, 
Mars Polar Lander, and the two Deep Space 2 micro-probes) failed due to causes that could be 
traced to insufficiently written and followed requirements and specifications.  Clearly, a change 
in the approach to writing system requirements and specifications is needed if these complex 
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systems are to be successful given the new budget and time constraints imposed.  The aerospace 
industry cannot afford this lack of attention to system level design and integration to cause 
further mission failures.  Three accounts of these types of failures in spacecraft are described 
below. 
 
1.1.1  Ariane 5 
 
The maiden flight of the Ariane 5 rocket was scheduled for June 4, 1996.  The flight 
ended in disaster approximately 40 seconds into the initial flight sequences when the launcher 
deviated from its flight path and exploded.  The report issued by the accident review board cited 
the main cause of the accident as complete loss of guidance and attitude information 30 seconds 
after liftoff.  The flight was nominal until 36 seconds after main engine ignition when the backup 
Inertial Reference System (SRI) failed, immediately followed by failure of the primary SRI.  
This loss of guidance and attitude information caused the nozzles of the two solid boosters and 
the Vulcain engine to swivel into the extreme position and the launcher veered off course.  The 
aerodynamic forces on the launcher caused disintegration to occur in the links between the solid 
booster and the core stage, triggering the self-destruction of the launcher. 
The failure of the primary and backup SRIs can be linked to two different problems in the 
requirements and specifications for the Ariane 5.  The first problem is that it was decided that the 
Ariane 5 was sufficiently similar to the Ariane 4 that the same software could be reused without 
making any changes.  However, sufficiently similar was not similar enough for this software.  
The preparation sequence for Ariane 5 was very different from Ariane 4, different enough that an 
alignment function included in the Ariane 4 software to allow an aborted countdown to restart 
did not apply to the Ariane 5.  This function was “maintained for commonality reasons, 
presumably based on the view that, unless proven necessary, it was not wise to make changes in 
software that worked well on Ariane 4” [12].  Though the function was maintained, the software 
was not tested with the Ariane 5 trajectory data that also differed from the Ariane 4 trajectory 
data.  Had this been done the results would have shown that significantly higher horizontal 
velocity values from the Ariane 5 trajectory caused an error in the alignment function due to an 
unprotected variable.  This error led to an exception that caused the deflection of the solid rocket 
boosters and high aerodynamic loads, forcing initiation of the self-destruction of the launcher 
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and its explosion.  Had the requirements and specifications not excluded the Ariane 5 trajectory 
data from system design, analysis and testing, it may have been detected before launch that the 
Ariane 4 software could not be reused without significant changes. 
The second, and possibly greater, problem in the requirements and specifications for 
Ariane 5, was that the supplier of the SRI “was only following the specification given to it, 
which stipulated that in the event of any detected exception the processor was to be stopped” 
[12].  Had the SRI unit continued to at least supply the guidance and attitude system with 
estimates of position, attempts could at least have been made to still salvage the launcher.  
However, because of this design flaw, the processor was shut down and could not be restarted.  
In addition, the redundancy designed for the Ariane 5 was to have identical copies of the 
hardware and software as backups to the primary system.  This means that both systems failed in 
identical manners due to identical design problems that were in software that was unnecessary 
for Ariane 5 and not even used in Ariane 4. 
 
1.1.2  Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) 
 
The Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) was part of the Mars Surveyor Program (MSP) 
established by NASA in 1994.  Its mission was to orbit Mars as the first interplanetary weather 
satellite and to serve as a communications relay for the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) that was to 
land a few months after MCO arrived at Mars.  MCO and MPL were to follow two largely 
successful missions in the Mars program, the Mars Pathfinder and the Mars Global Surveyor.  
The design teams for MCO and MPL had only 26 months to prepare for these missions in order 
to launch during the next minimum energy Earth-Mars transfer opportunity.  To meet these goals 
the two project teams had to use what they could from the designs of the previously successful 
missions, despite differences in the spacecraft and a lack of familiarity with the necessary 
spacecraft navigation information. 
 MCO launched on December 11, 1998 and was lost sometime during the Mars Orbit 
Insertion (MOI) on September 23, 1999.  The spacecraft signal was lost over 30 seconds earlier 
than predicted for Mars occultation loss of signal and never appeared again.  The investigation 
team was able to determine from the spacecraft telemetry that MCO’s trajectory was nearly 170 
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kilometers lower than planned at the time of MOI.  This resulted in either the destruction of the 
spacecraft in the atmosphere or re-entry into heliocentric space [18]. 
 As in Ariane 5, the errors that led to this accident can be traced back to problems in the 
requirements and specifications for MCO and in the system engineering process for the mission.  
The “root cause” identified by the investigation committee was that the software file used in 
MCO trajectory modeling was in English units, rather than the metric units that were specified 
and expected by navigation teams, creating an erroneous trajectory for the spacecraft.  The data 
from this file was used for each Trajectory Correction Maneuver (TCM) to correct the spacecraft 
trajectory en route to Mars, but in effect compounding the error. 
 The Project Software Interface Specification (SIS) to be used for MCO required the 
output of the application code SM_FORCES to be in metric units of Newton-seconds.  This code 
is used as part of the angular momentum management procedure.  To keep the spacecraft’s 
reaction wheels unsaturated, thruster firings are used for Angular Momentum Desaturation 
(AMD).  Each time an AMD event occurs, the spacecraft data is sent to the ground, processed by 
SM_FORCES, and placed in an AMD file.  The AMD files are then used to model the forces on 
the spacecraft from the thruster firings and determine the spacecraft trajectory.  While the 
software on the spacecraft had the correct units, the ground software did not, and it was the 
ground version of the AMD files used to determine the spacecraft trajectory.  This problem was 
not even noticeable for the first few months of cruise to Mars because the ground software 
system was not used due to other reported errors. 
 MCO is a clear example of difficulties with implementing requirements and 
specifications in complex mission design.  Here the requirements existed, but due to 
miscommunication and lack of specification use, an accident still occurred.  The system 
engineering process for MCO was not sufficient to ensure that all participants followed the 
supplied requirements and specifications.  The process also was lacking in transitional plans 
from design to operations, as the trajectory problem could have been detected by the operations 
crew early enough in the cruise phase to perform another TCM to possibly save the mission, if 
they were properly trained for MCO operations and the differences in this spacecraft design and 





1.1.3  Mars Polar Lander (MPL) 
 
 The Mars Polar Lander (MPL) was another part of the Mars Surveyor program.  Its 90-
day mission was to study the surface environment, weather and geology at the landing site.  MPL 
was designed to send its data to Earth through a relay from MCO.  Given that MCO had already 
been lost when MPL was to land, MPL could also communicate either directly to Earth or 
through the Mars Global Surveyor satellite. 
 MPL was launched on January 3, 1999 and arrived at Mars after an 11-month cruise on 
December 3, 1999.  Trajectory correction maneuvers were performed for MPL based on 
recommendations discovered during the MCO accident review.  As occurred for MCO, there was 
a loss of signal from MPL when entering the Martian atmosphere and the spacecraft was not 
heard from again.  Due to a lack of any telemetry data during the entry and landing phase of 
MPL, the probable cause for spacecraft lost was determined to be premature shutdown of the 
descent engines by the flight software. 
 The landing legs of the lander were to deploy from a stowed state to the landing position 
at an altitude of approximately 1500 meters above the Martian surface.  This deployment occurs 
while the lander is still attached to the parachute.  A Hall Effect magnetic sensor on each leg 
generates a voltage when the leg contacts the surface.  When the first landing leg detects the 
surface a command from the flight software directs the engine to cut-off.  Should the sensor in 
that leg fail, then the second landing leg would trigger the engine cut-off to prevent tipping the 
lander over.  The flight software also was required to protect against a false touchdown signal or 
failed sensor in the landing legs. 
 It was known that the sensors on the landing legs generated a false signal when deployed 
due to the movement of the legs from stowed to deployed.  The flight software was to ignore the 
signals from these events, but the requirements and specifications of these events were not 
described to the software engineers, and thus were not properly accounted for in the flight 
software.  Once the lander was at an altitude of 40 meters and the sensor data was enabled, the 
engine shutdown command was followed and the lander would free fall to the surface and impact 
at a velocity of 50 miles per hour [1]. 
The errors found in these three accidents could have been prevented had the system 
designers taken their design and written requirements and specifications for the mission that 
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properly communicated the information to all those involved in the project.  Using the 
requirements and specifications formulated in this way, a formal approach to validating the 
system could be applied to detect requirement errors, such as those found in these accidents, long 
before the system ever leaves the design phase.  The next chapter defines system engineering and 
discusses visualizations commonly used in system design.  These visualizations are then used to 
create an intent specification.  Intent specifications and SpecTRM are a formal approach to 
system engineering and will be described in Chapter 3.  The next section describes factors in the 
aerospace industry that are making the development of successful next generation spacecraft a 
difficult feat. 
 
1.2  Current Problems in the Aerospace Industry 
 
The aerospace industry is not just plagued with the external problems of budget cuts, 
public opinion and political sway.  There are also difficulties within the aerospace industry that 
need to be addressed to adequately change the system engineering process and reduce the errors 
seen in the accidents presented earlier in this chapter.  The problems presented here add to the 
complexity of developing a suitable system engineering process for developing successful 
spacecraft. 
 
1.2.1  Miscommunication Among Designers, User and Operators 
 
 The background, experience and focus of the people working together on any given 
aerospace project are widely varied.  This type of multi-disciplinary project team is common in 
the aerospace industry, particularly in the system development phase.  Spacecraft are composed 
of a variety of different subsystems including attitude determination and control, 
communications, power, propulsion, structures, thermal and other specialized subsystems 
depending on the spacecraft payload.  Once launched, flight software controls the subsystems 
and allows the spacecraft to accomplish the mission objectives.  The engineers and scientists on 
these teams are experts in fields varying from mechanical engineering to computer science to 
geology.  These individuals have extremely diverse backgrounds, talents and communication 
skills and are often not used to presenting their subsystem needs and abilities to others who have 
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no knowledge of their specialty.  The terminology and language each of these experts uses to 
convey subsystem operation is frequently different, even when referring to the same or similar 
concepts.  Modeling and design tools and problem solving approaches also differ, leaving little to 
no common ground for system level understanding.  In addition, users of the system are often not 
incorporated into the design phase of the mission, forcing an operator or end-user to adapt to the 
user interface designed even if it is contradictory to previous training or innate sense.  These 
differences and communication problems among team members can lead to misunderstanding or 
omission of mission critical details in the system.  A common communication platform is needed 
to facilitate understanding among diverse team members and decrease ambiguity in system 
design.  At the same time, this platform needs to be easy to implement without a significant 
training period to allow all team members easy access to the information.  This will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
1.2.2  Usage of Requirements Documentation in the Design Phase 
 
 As was described in the Mars Climate Orbiter accident report, even when requirement 
and specification documentation exists, that does not always mean it is used by those it is most 
intended to aide.  Not only is the use of requirement and specification documentation not 
enforced among design team members, it often is not provided to subsystem team members 
actually designing the details of the subsystem components.  When the documentation is 
provided it is frequently in a format that is difficult to understand or use in subsystem design and 
modeling.  Many times the different people working within a subsystem do not get to provide 
any input into the document, resulting in requirements and specifications written by those who 
are not most experienced with that subsystem function.  System level knowledge, such as this 
documentation, needs to be captured and recorded in an easily readable format so that it can be 
disseminated to all team members working on the spacecraft.  Rationale behind the requirement 
and specification decisions also needs to be documented so that design decisions can be 
understood and reviewed if needed.  This also ensures that the information is passed on to the 
next generation of spacecraft engineers who need to understand the rationale behind why these 




1.2.3  Lack of Formal Validation of Requirements and System Integration Prior 
to Build and Test Stages 
 
 Formal requirements specifications are frequently not used in complex system design 
because it is felt that there is too much training involved in learning how to use a formal model.  
Formal modeling is not traditionally covered in the curriculum of most engineering disciplines, 
nor is it exposed to new hires when starting in the aerospace industry, or any engineering related 
field.  As many professionals already in the industry believe formal models to be unreadable and 
difficult to learn due its base in complex mathematics, their use is extremely infrequent, despite 
the value gained from their utilization.  A platform for using formal requirements specification 
needs to be easy to learn and easily readable by all those team members who need to use the 
information it contains.  The specification needs to be easy to create by any team member so that 
as changes and developments in the design process are discovered, the specification can be 
changed if necessary and the system can be analyzed and executed again to see how the change 
will affect other system components.  With a formal requirements specification, this can happen 
in the design stages when system changes are still easy and inexpensive, rather than during 
hardware integration when a quick fix approach may lead to a solution that has farther-reaching 
system problems. 
 
1.3  Summary 
 
 The aerospace industry is currently faced with two different types of problems.  The 
current economy and political climate is limiting the funding available to the aerospace industry.  
This is compounded by the highly publicized failures of recent space missions, taking away 
public support from space research.  The other problems are those within in the aerospace 
industry itself.  A lack of understanding between engineers with different backgrounds can lead 
to costly mistakes.  Poor usage of requirement and specification documentation in the design 
stages of spacecraft development can also lead to system level problems that are not discovered 
until much later in the mission development timeline, causing budget and schedule problems and 
jeopardizing the mission.  As the system design process progresses and design changes are made, 
the rationale behind these changes must be documented for future knowledge and to ensure that 
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the changes are in agreement with the other design requirements and specifications.  With the 
conception of new and more complex missions, a formal validation of requirements and 
specifications prior to the build and test phase is necessary to ensure mission success throughout 
the later stages of mission development. 
 
1.4  Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis proposes using existing system design visualizations to create intent 
specifications for analyzing and executing complex system designs in the development stages.  
Chapter 2 provides background on Systems Engineering and some commonly used System 
Design Visualizations.  These visualizations are examples from system design and product 
development texts that show graphical representations of complex systems.  The data displayed 
through these visualizations will then be used to synthesize an intent specification in SpecTRM. 
Chapter 3 describes the systems engineering development platform called SpecTRM.  
SpecTRM is a toolkit that allows users to create intent specifications that can be analyzed and 
executed to evaluate the design in the development stages.  This allows requirement and 
specification problems to be detected at an earlier stage in the system development process to 
avoid budget and schedule overruns, and system failures. 
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the system design visualizations feed data into an intent 
specification in SpecTRM with the Mobility And Positioning System (MAPS).  MAPS is part of 
the shuttle Thermal Tile Processing System (TTPS), which is a mobile robot system designed to 
service tiles on the Space Shuttle.  The goal of this system is to save humans from performing 
the tedious and potentially toxic task that spans the time between shuttle landing and re-launch, 
lasting up to 4 months.  Finally, Chapter 5 contains the conclusions drawn from the research and 
example case.   
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 This chapter defines System Engineering and reviews some commonly used System 
Design Visualizations used in system development.  Different sources have different definitions 
for System Engineering and related terms, so a few different views will be presented here.  The 
visualizations presented are examples from systems engineering texts and papers.  These 
visualizations are different manners of presenting information during the design phase of 
complex systems.  Some visualizations are based on the same information, but present the data in 
a different manner, showing different relationships involved in the system.  Utilizing these 
existing system design visualizations to synthesize an intent specification is then outlined, with 
an example of such a synthesis presented in Chapter 4.  
 
2.1  Systems Engineering 
 
As complex systems in the aerospace industry become more heavily reliant on software 
for system operations after launch, a strong systems engineering development process in the 
design phase becomes increasingly important.  Accidents involving computers are usually due to 
flaws in the software requirements, not coding errors or hardware failures [7].  Incorporating 
software development into the systems engineering process from the beginning stages of the 
system design helps engineers recognize how hardware and software must interact in the system, 
and allows for more complete requirements specification.  Documentation of the requirements is 
also especially important in complex systems where software designers and other engineers may 
be very unfamiliar with the functions of other hardware and software in the system.  Thorough 
documentation, trade-off analyses and testing increases the quality of requirements specifications 
by uncovering problems early in the lifecycle and decreasing the cost of correcting these 
mistakes.  Requirements specifications are analyzed before any code is ever written or any 
hardware implementation is completed, saving time and money if changes are necessary. 
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A system can be defined as a group of related components that function together to 
complete a common goal or task.  The systems seen in the aerospace industry are becoming 
increasingly complex.  The factors adding to system complexity are the component interactions 
and interdependencies within the system.  These detailed interactions between system 
components mean that no individual part of the system can be engineered independently of the 
rest of the system, or the part may not function properly when it is later introduced to the rest of 
the system.  A view of the entire system with individual component operations and interactions 
must be used in system development in order for the components to function correctly in their 
system level capacity.  This approach to design is called systems engineering.    
Many different definitions exist for the term systems engineering, though all contain 
similar ideas.  A Space Systems Engineering course at MIT defines system engineering as “the 
ensemble of coordinated analyses, simulations, and processes which lead to the design of a 
technical product which best meets the needs of an identified customer” [14].  This approach 
tells the “whole story” of a system, including the why, which, what, how, when, and where, to 
the customer in order to meet the customer’s needs.  Here, “why” refers to the requirements that 
define the customer’s needs and the point of the mission being conducted.  “Which” is a trades 
analysis to compare different system architectures to determine what best meets the requirements 
and customer needs.  “What” is the design that fully describes the system to be built and 
operated.  “How” is the program plan to provide for an organizational structure for the system, 
allocation of resources, schedule, and information dissemination.  “When” is the schedule for 
system development stages.  Lastly, “where” refers to hardware flow details, obtaining 
components, the facilities for integration, test, and validation, as well as checkout and launch 
[14].   
Another definition for systems engineering comes from the NASA Systems Engineering 
Handbook, where systems engineering is “a robust approach to the design, creation and 
operation of systems” [15].  This approach also consists of identifying and quantifying system 
goals, creating alternative design concepts, performing a trade-off analysis of these designs, 
selecting and implementing the best design, verifying that the design was properly built and 
implemented and finally assessing how well the system meets the goals [15].  While the 




The International Council on Systems Engineering also has a different definition:  
“Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization of 
successful systems.  It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality early in the 
development cycle, documenting requirements, then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem.  Systems engineering integrates all 
the disciplines and specialty groups into a team effort forming a structured development process 
that proceeds from concept to production to operation” [4]. 
 Systems engineering has also become recognized as a separate department for studies at 
MIT.  The MIT Engineering Systems Division (ESD) first defines systems architecture as “the 
process by which standards, rules, system structures and interfaces are created in order to achieve 
the requirements of a system; trade-off studies may precede the determination of system 
requirements.” [13] This more closely fits the definitions described above for system 
engineering.  However, the ESD characterizes system engineering as “a process for designing 
systems that begins with requirements, that uses and/or modifies an architecture, accomplishes 
function and/or physical decomposition, and accounts for the achievement of the requirements 
by assigning them to entities and maintaining oversight on the design and integration of those 
entities…Systems architecting creates a system design at a high, abstract level, whereas systems 
engineering is often associated with refining such a design; by blending the two processes one 
accomplishes the assignment of functions to physical or abstract entities, and the definition of 
interactions and interfaces between the entities.” [13] This definition better recognizes the fact 
that not all parts of system engineering are tangible components, but that software components 
also need to be factored into the development processes. 
 Systems engineering is multidisciplinary.  The complex systems in aerospace are 
composed of many different subsystems, including everything from human operations to 
software to electronics and fuel.  Engineers taking part in the system development process come 
from all different disciplines to contribute to the overall system functionality.  Systems 
engineering is also all inclusive of all aspects of the system at hand.  It involves subsystem and 
component trade-off analyses and evaluation of customer need and requirements satisfaction at 
each stage in the development lifecycle.  The systems engineering approach to complex systems 
development also means that the engineers working on different system components are 
cognizant of the rest of the system and how other system components function in the overall 
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system.  Finally, systems engineering throughout the system development lifecycle reduces costs 
by creating design alternatives at each development stage so that a problem at one stage in 
development does not send the entire system development back to square one. 
 
2.2  System Design Visualizations 
 
Visualizations have long been used a way to enhance cognition of information, 
particularly large and complex amounts of information [2].  Graphics become a common ground 
for understanding between people whose backgrounds and disciplinary languages differ.  The 
majority of the published work on visualizations for cognition revolves around displaying data 
and not on systems or development processes.  This does not mean that visualizations are not 
used in system design, but rather how they function in terms of information understanding has 
not been widely studied.  The visualizations that are described in the following sections are taken 
from texts on system design and system design documents themselves to demonstrate how multi-
disciplinary engineering teams use visualizations to enhance system understanding during the 
development lifecycle. 
 
2.2.1  System Process Flow Diagrams 
 
System process flow diagrams are common at the beginning of system design to 
determine system components and the basic links between these components.   They are block 
diagrams where the blocks represent different subsystems in the complex system and arrows 
from one block to another block represent interactions between the subsystems.  This 
visualization is useful in complex systems because it can be made as detailed or as all-
encompassing as necessary depending on what part of the design or design lifecycle is being 
represented.  Figure 1 shows a sample system process flow diagram for a spacecraft modeling 
project at the highest level.  The block labeled Spacecraft Model can then be made into a 
separate system flow diagram of its own to show the interactions of the subsystems it contains.  
Notice in this version of the diagram there are no arrows linking the subsystem blocks within the 




Figure 1.  Sample System Process Flow Diagram 
 
 System process flow diagrams are easy to construct and well understood by multi-
disciplinary project team members.  They also provide a good amount of system level 
information that can be easily incorporated into an intent specification. 
 
2.2.2  Tree Diagrams 
 
Tree diagrams are another commonly found visualization tool in system development.  
Tree diagrams are composed of nodes and branches.  The nodes can represent different things 
depending on the function of a given tree, for example if using a tree diagram for a preliminary 
hazard analysis a node may represent an event that occurred leading to a hazard.  A node can 
also represent a piece of hardware or even a subsystem.  The branches in a tree diagram represent 
unidirectional links to the next node, and often have conditions attached to them.  Tree diagrams 
can be used to converge to one node, or as diverging from one node as shown in Figure 2.  This 
is highly dependent on what information is being conveyed through the diagram.  Tree diagrams 
are useful in identifying parts of a subsystem and the breakdown within a subsystem as is shown 
in Figure 2 part A.  They are also useful in preliminary hazard analysis when brainstorming ways 

































Figure 2.  Sample Tree Diagrams 
 
 Tree diagrams are a very familiar and comfortable visualization for conveying 
information.  They are simple to use and can be expanded or collapsed as necessary for whatever 
level of design is being addressed.  They can also be easily tailored to many different system 
design needs. 
  
2.2.3  N2 Diagrams 
 
N2 Diagrams are useful matrix notation visualizations for showing the interactions of 
different subsystems and even the actual variables and information needed in the interactions.  
This diagram is helpful in determining if a reordering or restructuring of the elements in the 
diagram would help simply parts of the system.  Boxes that are checked represent inputs to the 
subsystem in the column from the subsystem in the row.  If the box is checked above the 
diagonal indicate a linear flow of the system.  Boxes checked below the diagonal indicate that 
information from one subsystem was returned to another and could possibly change the effect on 


























Figure 3.  Sample N2 Diagram 
Sample based on a Mars Rover Design Tool [14] 
  
 The sample N2 diagram shown in Figure 3 shows a system that is mostly linear in 
function but does have one iterative step, as the box between Rover and Power is checked below 
the diagonal.  This kind of interface information is valuable, particularly when developing the 
software in the system development phases. 
 
2.2.4  State Transition Diagrams 
 
State transition diagrams are very important in system design.  This is a visualization that 
helps coordinate development of the system states.  Depending on the system being designed, 
this can include operating states, states of individual parts of the subsystems, and states displayed 
to the user.  The executable intent specifications that will be discussed in the next chapter are 
based on an underlying state machine model, so these diagrams are very useful in creating intent 
specifications. State transition diagrams show the feasible states of a particular part of a system, 
and how transitions from one state to another can occur.  Figure 4 shows a simplified state 
transition diagram for a simple spacecraft [5].  The nodes here are the different possible system 
states.  The links between the different states represent conditions for changing from one state to 
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another.  In this example there is only one condition on each link, but it is possible in a much 
more complex system to have multiple conditions that are required to leave a given state. 
 
Figure 4.  Sample State Transition Diagram 
 
 As with the other diagrams shown thus far, this diagram is very easy to create and 
understand, as well as useful in synthesizing intent specifications. 
 
2.2.5  User and Task Models 
 
User and Task Models are important visualizations in complex system design in helping 
to identify the potential for mode confusion in a system.  The aerospace industry utilizes 
automation in many systems to cut personnel costs, and also to further research in the automation 
field.  However, the use of automation in complex systems creates different types of problems 
because of the new type of interaction between the human operator and the automated system.  
Creating user and task models helps the design team to recognize designs that could potentially 
























currently in or how it got there.  Figure 5 shows the user and task models created for a flight 
management system case study [16]. 
 Figure 5.  Sample User and Task Model [16] 
 
 Information from models such as these is very important in synthesizing intent 
specifications as accidents caused by mode confusion are often due to a lack of requirements to 
prevent the confusion from occurring. 
 
2.2.6  Input/Output Diagrams 
 
Input/Output diagrams are blackbox representations of what goes into and out of a 
subsystem or subsystem component.  They can be simple diagrams that only show the inputs and 
outputs to one given subsystem as shown in Figure 6, or they can show multiple components and 
the inputs and outputs passed between them.  Input and output information is important in system 
design to ensure that the information that each subsystem needs is generated and passed from 
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other subsystems.  Figure 6 shows inputs coming from two different sources and outputs being 
sent to three different subsystems. 
 
Figure 6.  Sample Input/Output Diagram 
 
2.2.7  Key Metric Value Charts 
 
Key Metric Value Charts are tabular methods of representing system design information.  
Tables can display large amounts of information in an organized and easily understandable 
format.  The types of system information that can be presented in this way includes design 
limitations, input and output lists separated by subsystems, user defined limits, and much more.  
Figure 7 shows a sample chart of required inputs and outputs from different spacecraft 
subsystems. 
 
Figure 7.  Sample Key Metric Value Chart – Inputs/Outputs 
Subsystem Inputs From Outputs To 
Power Max. Temp. Ranges Environment Power Available Communications 
 Power Rqmnt. over time All Subsystems   
Communications Power Available Power Power Rqmnt. over time Power 
 Data Volume Instruments   
 Data Rate    
 Data Storage Rqmnt.    











This chart would be used in the system design phase to ensure that the different 
subsystem team members know exactly what information they must be able to provide for other 
subsystems to consider when designing their own subsystems.  For example, the power 
subsystem would need to know the power each subsystem requires when operating in order to 
use an appropriately sized power system to accomplish the mission tasks.  This information 
details the links and interfaces between subsystems in another format for multi-disciplinary team 
members to understand when designing their separate subsystem.  Another key metric value 
chart may display component attributes, as shown in Figure 8 [5].  
 
Figure 8.  Sample Key Metric Value Chart – Subsystem Component Attributes 
 
 Attributes such as these can be used as values to satisfy the input and output information 
a subsystem needs for system integration.  These values are also used when creating executable 
models for system operations.  Data from charts such as these provide the values and variables 
necessary to give definition to the system design in an intent specification. 
 
2.3  Summary 
 
System design visualizations are valuable tools in systems engineering, particularly in the 
design phase of the system development lifecycle.  Left alone the visualizations do provide 
useful information to multi-disciplinary team members, but they do no more than just provide 
information.  The data these visualizations contain can be put to much more use in system 
engineering if they are utilized to synthesize an intent specification.  Now the information is not 
Subsystem Component Weight (kg) Power (W) 
ADCS Sun Sensor 0.5 0.1 
Communications S-band antenna 0.9 0 
 Receiver 1.8 4 
 Transmitter 2 4.4 
 Diplexer 1.2 0 
Power Solar Arrays 0.04 - 
 Batteries Capacity/35 - 
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only useful and easy to understand, but it is also executable, and more valuable in determining 
requirements and specifications needed for a successful complex system.  The next chapter 
describes a systems engineering development platform for creating these intent specifications to 
enhance the systems development process. 
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 A platform is needed to use the systems design visualizations described in the previous 
chapter to construct executable system models.  This chapter discusses intent specifications and 
SpecTRM as a platform for this approach to systems engineering.  The system design 
visualizations provide the information for an intent specification that can be built in SpecTRM.  
SpecTRM is a toolkit for creating intent specifications and performing formal analyses on the 
model.  Finally, a recent system engineering application of SpecTRM is discussed in which 
separate intent specifications are created for reusable generic spacecraft components in order to 
utilize SpecTRM as a platform for Component-Based Systems Engineering. 
 
3.1  Intent Specifications and SpecTRM 
 
An intent specification is documentation of the analysis, design, implementation and 
operation for a system.  The structure of an intent specification is based on human problem 
solving and supports basic system engineering principles.  Specifications are used to perform 
analysis, review software designs, debug, maintain, and reengineer systems as needed.  Primarily 
an intent specification differs from a standard specification in structure.  Intent specifications are 
structured as a set of models designed to describe the system from different viewpoints 
throughout the entire system development process.  The structure facilitates the tracing of 
system-level requirements and design constraints down into the detailed design and 
implementation.  It assists in the assurance that system properties, such as safety and system 
security, are incorporated and implemented in the design from the beginning.  The structure also 
reduces the costs of implementing changes and reanalysis when system changes occur.  Intent 
specifications enhance problem-solving performance because they help designers extract the 
important information necessary for a system without making any modelling assumptions.  
System designers and engineers are not limited to a specific manner of carrying out the system 
design tasks in intent specifications, but rather the information needed to accomplish these tasks 
is recorded and whatever strategy the designer chooses to take in using the information can be 
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taken.  No additional specification is involved in this process (assuming that projects produce the 
usual specifications), but simply a different structuring and linking of the information produced 
so that specifications are used more often and correctly in the development and evolution process 
[8]. 
An intent specification is comprised of seven levels as shown in Figure 9 [8].  It is 
important to note that the different levels do not represent refinement, as in other more common 
hierarchical structures.  In an intent specification the levels represent a different model of the 
same system and support a different perspective of the complete system.  The model at each 
level may be described in terms of a different set of attributes or language.  Refinement and 
decomposition occurs within each level of the specification, rather than between levels [8]. 
The top level, or Level 0, is a project management view of the system and provides 
insight into the relationship between the plans and project development.  Level 1 of an intent 
specification is the customer view.  This level assists system engineers and customers in agreeing 
on what should be built and whether that has been accomplished.  It includes system goals, high-
level requirements, design constraints, hazards, environmental assumptions, and system 
limitations.  Level 2 is the System Design Principles level.  This is the system engineering level 
used by engineers to reason about the system in terms of the governing physical principles and 
laws that apply to the system being designed. 
 
Figure 9.  Intent Specification Hierarchy 
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The third level, or Blackbox Model level, enhances reasoning about the logical design of 
the system as a whole and the interactions between system components, including system 
functional states, without being distracted by implementation issues.   Level 3 acts as an 
unambiguous interface between systems engineering and component engineering to assist in 
communication and review of subsystem blackbox behavioural requirements and to reason about 
the combined behaviour of individual components using informal review, formal analysis, and 
simulation.  The language used on this level, SpecTRM-RL, is based on an underlying formal 
model, so it can be executed and subjected to formal analysis while still being readable to multi-
disciplinary team members with minimal training and expertise in discrete math. 
The next two levels provide the information necessary to reason about individual 
component design and implementation issues.  Finally, the sixth level provides a view of the 
operational system.  Each level is linked to the levels above and below it.  These links provide 
the relational information that allows reasoning across the hierarchical levels and tracing from 
high-level requirements down to implementation and vice versa.  When working with the system 
design on a particular level these links provide the rationale and answers to design questions, 
especially during maintenance activities. 
A very important part of an intent specification is that the intent information is present to 
represent the design rationale upon which the specification is based.  This design rationale is 
integrated directly into the specification so that any new person reading the intent specification 
for the first time will know why certain design choices were made by another designer.  The 
underlying assumptions supporting the design are also documented at each level.  These 
assumptions are especially important in operational safety analyses.  When conditions change 
such that the assumptions are no longer true, then a new safety analysis is necessary.  While a 
safety analysis document may record these assumptions, the system implementation to which 
they refer may not have a record of these effects. Without a means for linking these assumptions 
and how the changes will affect the system overall, a system safety engineer cannot easily 
determine what the system response will be to a change in this assumption or what part of the 
system it will most affect [8]. 
Intent specifications also integrate the safety database and information with the 
development specification and database so that all necessary information needed by team 
members in the design phase for design tradeoffs and system analyses is available.  When the 
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safety information system is separate from the development specifications and database, 
designers run the risk of not utilizing safety information at the beginning of the design 
development process.  This leads to information being ignored or argued away as it is too late in 
the development phase to easily change the design, and any such change would become quite 
costly.  Integrating system safety information into system development at the beginning stages of 
development ensures that safety is considered throughout the design process and included in 
analyses and testing from the start [8]. 
Interface specifications and specification of important aspects of environmental 
components are also integrated into the intent specification, as are human factors and human 
interface design.  The separation of human-automation interface design from the main system 
and component design can lead to serious deficiencies in each.  Finally, each level of the intent 
specification includes a specification of the requirements and results of verification and 
validation activities of the information at that specification level [8]. 
SpecTRM stands for Specification Toolkit and Requirements Methodology.  It is a 
development environment that allows users to easily create, modify and analyze intent 
specifications.  SpecTRM includes many features important to the intent specification process.  
First, an empty intent specification in SpecTRM contains headings that, when filled out, help 
ensure specification completeness.  SpecTRM provides this initial intent specification structure 
to the user to ensure completeness and include system design aspects that may have been ignored 
otherwise.  SpecTRM also provides an easy link creator.  Links between levels provide 
traceability within the specification from the highest requirements all the way down to 
implementation.  This is especially useful for tracking changes in design and rationales and for 
performing interface testing.  Finally, SpecTRM provides various analyses that can be performed 
on the Level 3 blackbox model [17]. 
 
3.1.1  Analyses 
 
SpecTRM currently provides two analyses that can be performed on the individual intent 
specifications.  These are non-determinism and robustness analyses.  A model is deterministic if 
for any given system state and set of inputs, there is only one transition for each state and mode 
[17].  A model is robust, if for any given system state and set of inputs, a transition exists.  That 
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is, a behavior is defined for all possible inputs [17].  These analyses allow the system engineers 
to eliminate all inconsistencies and incompleteness before the simulation is run.  The Level 3 
models can be checked automatically for these properties [3]. 
 
3.1.2  Simulations 
 
Perhaps the greatest advantage to utilizing intent specifications and SpecTRM is that the 
models created are executable.  The Level 3 blackbox model is a formal representation of an 
underlying state machine, so the model can be executed given a set of inputs.  Individual models 
can be executed in isolation and multiple models can be executed in an environment in which 
they interact with each other.  Components can be linked to their parent subsystems and the 
subsystems to the controller to simulate the system-as-a-whole. 
Executable models are extremely beneficial to the system development process.  These 
simulations allow system developers to observe the results of interactions between components 
and the functionality of the subsystem specification and model.  This is done at a point in the 
development lifecycle before code is written or hardware is fabricated, allowing changes to be 
made and errors to be corrected before costly steps are taken in the system development process.  
This is also especially important in system software engineering where code maintenance needs 
to be addressed, particularly in the aerospace industry where maintenance changes to be made 
can occur after launch.  An executable state machine provides the system software maintainers 
with the ability to incorporate changes to the code from the formal requirements specification, 
and simulate the effects those changes will have on the rest of the system, again before any code 
has been implemented or uplinked to the system.  This way system engineers can see the affects 
of system changes on the overall system before any implementation occurs, and potentially 
hazardous errors can be avoided. 
Executable blackbox models help developers to perform trade-off analyses.  Engineers 
can simulate alternative design strategies and determine which approach is most suitable given 
the constraints and requirements of the system.  Instead of a development team needing to create 
their own platform to perform such trade analyses, the same goal can be achieved by utilizing 
SpecTRM.  Once the trade-off analysis is complete, the development team already has an intent 
specification for their chosen design in place and ready for more detailed design work. 
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Lastly, just as different types of system design visualizations can aid in creating an intent 
specification, different types of visualizations of the underlying state machine can also allow 
users to facilitate the creation of a mental model of the system’s functioning.  A high quality 
mental model of the system will improve the requirements creation and reviewing process [2].  
Clearly, having a formal and executable blackbox model of the system provides engineers with 
the variety of benefits that aid in the proper implementation of a component-based development 
approach. 
 
3.1.3  SpecTRM-GSC 
 
SpecTRM-GSC stands for SpecTRM-Generic Spacecraft Components.  SpecTRM-GSC 
utilizes the SpecTRM platform to create separate executable intent specifications for different 
generic spacecraft components.  The components are generic to support good practices is 
spacecraft design reuse.  SpecTRM-GSC also contains component-level fault protection, laying 
the foundation for a fault protection scheme that parallels the spacecraft development process.  
The formal portion of the SpecTRM-GSC can also be analyzed individually, as part of their 
parent subsystem, or at the system-level before any implementation has taken place.  The 
creation of such a database of spacecraft components enhances the system design process by 
providing an existing component framework for beginning spacecraft system design that can be 
easily tailored to a specific spacecraft’s needs through defining the design values that make the 
component specific to the particular spacecraft being designed. 
 
3.2  Summary 
 
Intent specifications and SpecTRM provide a platform for creating executable models to 
be utilized in the system development process.  Intent specifications capture the design 
information from system design visualizations and record the rationale behind the design choices 
made at each step in the development lifecycle.  They abstract away the details of design so that 
the specifications can also be reusable from one project to the next.  Various analyses can be 
performed in SpecTRM, which aids in the development of autonomous systems.  System 
performance can be tested through simulation before any hardware is built or any code is written.  
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During maintenance, changes to the software can be easily documented and incorporated into the 
new system.  Engineers can also simulate design alternatives for trade-off analyses as well as 
visualize the underlying state machine to obtain a different perspective of the system.  The 
creation of SpecTRM-GSCs also aids the spacecraft development process by providing complete 
intent specifications for generic spacecraft components in a reusable and customizable format.  
The next chapter provides an example of using systems design visualizations to create an intent 
specification using SpecTRM as applied to a real system. 
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 MAPS stands for Mobility and Positioning System.  It is a subsystem of the Thermal Tile 
Processing System (TTPS).  The TTPS is a system designed to service the thermal tiles on the 
space shuttle after the spacecraft has returned to earth.  The current process involves humans 
visually checking each of the tiles and injecting a chemical into them with a handheld tool to 
waterproof the tiles.  This is a tedious process that usually spans the entirety of the three to four 
months the orbiter is on the ground between missions.  In addition, the chemical, DMES, used to 
waterproof the tiles is extremely toxic to humans, making heavy suits and respirators necessary 
for completing these tasks while also working in a crowded area [10].  The hope for the TTPS is 
that it will reduce the need for multiple inspections of individual tiles as the robot will have a 
much better ability to see tile defects than the naked human eye.  It would also eliminate the need 
for humans to perform this tedious and potentially hazardous task in an area already congested 
with other workers servicing other parts of the shuttle.  The original robot for the TTPS was 
designed as a research project at CMU with funding from NASA.  While it was delivered to 
NASA in 1994, there is no knowledge of it being used in shuttle servicing operations [10].  The 
robot design used in this example has been modified from the original for safety and to improve 
the system example [10]. 
 MAPS was chosen for this case study for two important reasons.  First, it is part of a 
complex system with many links to other subsystems.  The system design visualizations 
described in Chapter 2 can be used to show these links and the system flow into and out of 
MAPS as it relates to the larger, complex system.  Second, isolating one subsystem from the 
TTPS allows the design details of MAPS to be illustrated in the design visualizations and 
incorporated into a Level 3 blackbox model.  This chapter demonstrates the creation of system 
design visualizations for MAPS and how the information provided in these visualizations can be 





4.1  MAPS System Design Visualizations 
 
Chapter 2 outlined seven different system design visualizations.  In this section, those 
visualizations will be used to describe MAPS and to demonstrate their use in the MAPS design.  
MAPS is one of many subsystems that make up the mobile robot in the TTPS.  A preliminary 
hazard analysis performed at the beginning of the system design phase helps to alert multi-
disciplinary team members to potentially hazardous state the system could assume.  Identifying 
these hazards early in the design allows time for engineers to mitigate and even eliminate system 
hazards.  Figure 10 shows a tree diagram for part of a preliminary hazard analysis for MAPS. 
 
Figure 10.  MAPS Hazard Tree Diagram 
 
This tree diagram shows the factors that could occur and lead to the hazard of violating 
minimum separation between the mobile base and other objects in the shuttle servicing area.  By 
knowing what factors could lead to the minimum separation violation hazard, engineers can 
design the system to safely function to avoid this hazard from leading to an accident. 
Since MAPS is one of many different subsystems comprising the mobile robot 
component of the TTPS, it would be good to know what other subsystems are on the mobile 
Violation of minimum separation 
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robot and how they work together.  Figure 11 is a system process flow diagram for the mobile 
robot to show these interactions in the mobile robot system. 
 
Figure 11.  Mobile Robot System Process Flow Diagram 
 
This system process flow diagram shows that MAPS interacts with five other subsystems in the 
TTPS, the Aural and Visual Alert Subsystem (AS), the System Log (SL), the Location 
Subsystem (LS), the Motor Controller (MC), and the Tile Servicing Subsystem (TSS).  Other 
subsystems on the mobile robot indirectly affect MAPS through the TSS or through commands 
issued to other subsystems that are controlled by MAPS.  This diagram shows the basic 
interactions that the MAPS subsystem has during nominal TTPS operations. 
 An N2 diagram is another useful visualization to provide more detail about the 
interactions occurring between the mobile robot subsystems.  The N2 diagram in Figure 12 
shows the subsystem interactions directly with MAPS.  The subsystems not directly 

































Figure 12.  N2 Diagram for MAPS Subsystem Interactions 
 
This diagram also demonstrates a possible progression for system modeling of the mobile robot.  
This part of the system is mostly linear in terms of information passed from one subsystem to the 
next, except for the interactions between MAPS and the TSS.  This is a flag to system designers 
that the integration of these two systems must be carefully designed and tested to prevent 
interface problems. 
The N2 diagram in Figure 12 can be made larger and more detailed by incorporating more 
rows and columns between the subsystems and listing each of the different relevant subsystem 
inputs and outputs.  Since the intent specification to be developed from these visualizations is 
focusing on MAPS alone, it is not necessary to identify all of the inputs and outputs for the 
subsystems listed in the N2 diagram.  Only the MAPS inputs and outputs are of concern, so they 
can be better displayed by using an input/output diagram as shown in Figure 13.  This diagram 
shows exactly what information MAPS must provide to other subsystems, or receive from other 
subsystems in order to function properly within the TTPS.  By naming each of the inputs to and 














Figure 13.  MAPS Input/Output Diagram 
 
 MAPS is responsible for issuing the movement commands to the MC as supplied to 
MAPS either by the operator or by the TSS.  To accomplish its tasks, MAPS must have 
operating modes that allow for safe operation depending on what MAPS is currently trying to 
accomplish and what the state of the entire TTPS is at the time.  The MAPS movement control 
operating modes are Initialization, Computer Mode, Operator Mode, and Halted Mode.  Each of 
these modes has different system constraints when in that operating mode and for transferring 
from that operating mode to another.  One manner of displaying information about these modes 
is in a key metric chart.  The chart describes the requirements for transferring to each of the 
movement control modes, as well as from which modes transfer is allowable.  Safety constraints 
and rationales for each of the modes and mode requirements can also be included, as is seen in 
Figure 14.  By displaying the operating modes and the requirements in this way, engineers can 
see how the system can change modes and what problems can occur if not all transitions are 





























Mode Mode Requirements Safety Constraint 
Initialization Mode Enter Initialization at Powerup 
 
Enter Initialization after Safety Fuse 
reset 
 
System must reinitialize after a 
safety fuse reset event to prevent 
previously uncompleted movement 
from being continued, putting the 
mobile robot into a possible hazard 
situation 
Operator Mode Enter Operator Mode from 
Initialization 
 
Enter Operator after a temporary 
shutdown 
 
Enter Operator after deadman switch 
is released 
 
Enter Operator after Human 
Operator command to switch to 
Operator 
The joystick must be connected and 
in the neutral position to enter 
Operator mode 
 
The deadman switch must be 
depressed to enter Operator mode 
 
MAPS will default to Operator 
mode after Initialization to ensure 
the robot is not moved using 
automation without notice to the 
rest of the staff in the shuttle 
maintenance area 
 
While in Operator mode only 
movements from the joystick will 
be recognized, all TSS commands 
will be ignored 
Computer Mode Enter Computer after Human 
Operator commands to switch to 
Computer 
All joystick commands while the 
robot is in Computer mode will be 
ignored so as not to interfere with 
TSS and MAPS commands or cause 
inadvertent robot movement 
 
Release of the deadman switch will 
allow the human operator to 
immediately halt robot movement 
and switch to Operator mode 
Halted Mode Enter Halted when Safety Fuse 
enters Halt State 
Other subsystems may be still 
operating while the movement 
control mode is in Halted, so the 
movement control system must 
only switch to Initialize after Halted 
to allow the system and the human 
operator to know the current system 
state 
 
Figure 14.  MAPS Movement Control Mode Key Metric Chart 
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 Now that the movement control modes are known, and rules for entering each mode are 
documented, a state transition diagram can be created to better visualize the state changes and be 
sure that only one transition from one mode to another is possible.  The state transition diagram 
in Figure 15 shows the designed mode transitions for MAPS. 
 
 
Figure 15.  MAPS Movement Control State Transition Diagram 
 
Now it is easier to see that once the system enters Halted mode, it is only possible to get out of 
that mode by going to Initialization.  This is important to prevent mobile robot movement while 
there may be a problem in one of the subsystems, or while there are problems in the operating 
environment of the robot. 
Mode confusion is a relatively new problem in the aerospace industry as more and more 
systems are adding automation and making the human operators into system monitors, rather 
than the humans operating the system directly.  When a system relies on humans to monitor, but 
not interactively operate a system, a new type of error can occur, known as mode confusion.  
Mode confusion is when an automated system enters a mode without the human operator 
knowing that a change has occurred.  The human operator may know that the mode has changed, 





























change to occur, or in the worst case scenario, the operator may not know that a mode change 
has occurred at all, and still believes the system to be operating in a different mode.  This kind of 
confusion can lead to serious accidents.  User and task models help engineers to recognize if a 
potential for mode confusion exists in a system so that design changes may be made to prevent it.  
Figure 16 shows a user and task model for MAPS describing the situations that cause MAPS to 
stop the mobile robot. 
 
Figure 16.  MAPS User and Task Model 
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 The task model shows the five different situations that could occur to cause MAPS to 
stop the mobile robot.  In the user model, the operator is directly responsible for two of the 
actions: releasing the deadman switch on the control panel and switching MAPS to Operator 
mode.  A Safety Fuse to the Halt state alert would also be displayed to the operator on the control 
panel, so the operator would know if the robot was stopped for this reason.  The operator will not 
know, however, if the mobile robot stops because it has reached the work area it was directed to 
or if it stops because MAPS was disabled.  This problem can lead to significant work delays if 
the operator is unsure of what to do to get the robot to begin moving again, or if any action on 
the human operator’s part is required at all.  It could also lead to a hazard if the operator tries to 
command the robot to move but it has begun servicing a tile in its commanded position.  The 
user and task models bring this discrepancy to the attention of the design team so that the 
problem can be dealt with in the design.  Instead of having a problem such as this, a simple 
solution such as displaying a status message to the operator that MAPS has been disabled or that 
the robot has arrived at its location can be incorporated into the design instead. 
These visualizations were used to create an intent specification for MAPS in the 
SpecTRM environment.  The next section describes how the data from these visualizations can 
be easily translated into SpecTRM-RL and used to populate Levels 1, 2 and 3 of an intent 
specification. 
 
4.2  SpecTRM-RL Examples of Visualization Information 
 
 This section describes how the information on MAPS presented in the system design 
visualizations can be used to synthesize an intent specification in SpecTRM to create an 
executable system model based on requirements and design specifications.  Appendix A provides 
complete Levels 1, 2 and 3 of the MAPS intent specification. 
Level 0 of the specification was left blank in the MAPS specification, as it is particular to 
the organization and engineering team of the project.  Since a project management group does 
not exist for this project, Level 0 would be filled in once it is determined.  Level 1 of the 
specification includes the system-level goals, requirements and constraints.  The system process 
flow in Figure 11 identifies the subsystems that need to be included in the intent specification 
and have high-level functional requirements, even if the detailed design is not focusing on that 
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subsystem’s function.  For example, Figure 17 demonstrates a high-level functional requirement 
for the TSS, based on the subsystem relationships shown in the system process flow diagram in 
Figure 11, as well as the N2 diagram in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 17.  Level 1 Functional Requirement 
 
This specifies part of the relationship of the TSS to MAPS at a high-level.  This 
requirement also includes four links at the end.  These are hyperlinks within SpecTRM to link 
different parts of the intent specification for design traceability.  The first link points to the 
subsystem goal, also at Level 1.  Goals are included for documentation and intent completeness, 
but are too high level to be requirements.  They are not necessarily testable, and there may be 
many system designs that meet the system’s goals that are unacceptable due to other constraints.  
High-level requirements are generated from the goals and constraints present at this level.  These 
are the “shall” statements that specify what the system is to do and are the testable requirements. 
The remaining three links point down to design principles at Level 2 that provide 
information about the route determination and coordinates for robot movement.  The rationale 
also informs the engineering design team as to why this relationship exists and what its intended 
role is in the entire system.  In this example, the rationale specifies the need to alert the human 
operator of the movement commands issued by the TSS to avoid the potential mode confusion 
problem identified by the MAPS user and task model in Figure 16.  The information from the 
user and task model is captured in this rationale on Level 1 and will also be considered when 
applying this high-level functional requirement to a design principle on Level 2. 
These high-level functional requirements and constraints can also be found in key metric 
charts, such as the one for the MAPS movement control modes.  An example safety-related 


















































Figure 18.  Level 1 Safety-Related Design Constraint 
 
The links at the end of the safety constraint point to the hazard this constraint is to mitigate and 
the functional requirement it constrains.  This safety constraint is expanded in sub-constraints to 
include in detail the different ways that MAPS must stop the robot from moving to prevent a 
hazard.  These sub-constraints of the MAPS-SC1 safety constraint can be found in Appendix A. 
Another part of Level 1 in SpecTRM is information on the preliminary subsystem hazard 
analysis.  A hazard analysis at this level involves identifying system hazards, defining a safety 
policy, classifying the hazards, and performing a hazard analysis.  The hazards in the TTPS 
relate to human injury or damage to the orbiter.  The identified hazards must be eliminated or 
mitigated by the system design.  If a hazard cannot be eliminated, then the design features and 
development procedures that were used to reduce the hazard level must be documented and 
presented to the system management and customers before the system development process can 
resume.  Testing is not enough to mitigate a hazard because it is impossible to know if all 
possible occurrences or situations to cause a hazard are known, before the hazard actually occurs. 
A fault tree is one common way of performing a hazard analysis, and a portion of the 
MAPS fault tree was shown in Figure 10.  The information in this tree diagram can be used to 
create a hazard log entry in SpecTRM.  Figure 19 shows the hazard log entry created using the 
tree diagram.  Level 1 information shown in the hazard log description consists of general 
background, historical information, environment descriptions, assumptions and constraints, 
system functional goals, operator requirements, interface requirements, design and safety 
constraints and information about the verification and validation requirements and results on the 






























Figure 19.  Level 1 Hazard Log Description 
 























































































































































































Level 1 requirements.  Figure 20 provides an example of a design principle taken from the 
MAPS movement control key metric chart in Figure 14 and state transition diagram in Figure 15 
and linked to a safety-related constraint from Level 1 (Figure 18).  It defines the conditions for 
entering one of the movement control modes in MAPS.  
 
Figure 20.  Level 2 Design Principle 
 
 Level 3 of the intent specifications contains a formal, blackbox model of the component’s 
externally visible behavior.  The formal models, which are based on state machines, are specified 
using a language called SpecTRM-RL that was designed with reviewability and ease of learning 
as goals.  Experience in using the language on industrial projects shows engineers can learn to 
read SpecTRM-RL models with about ten to fifteen minutes of training.  This allows for formal 
models based on the system requirements to be easily constructed and analyzed prior to hardware 
and software development.  The resulting document is in English and is easily readable by multi-
disciplinary design team members. 
 The behavior of MAPS, or the logic for determining subsystem function, sending outputs 
to other subsystems, and changing the inferred operating state, is specified using a tabular 
notation called AND/OR tables.  The rows of the tables indicate AND relationships, while the 
columns represent ORs.  This logic can be used to represent state and mode transitions, such as 
those shown in the MAPS movement control state transition diagram in Figure 15.  Figure 21 
shows the transition conditions required for the “MovementControl” supervisor mode to take the 
values “Initialization,” “Operator,” “Computer” and “Halted” as they were described in Figure 
15.  Using the AND/OR tables in Figure 21, the MAPS operating mode “MovementControl” will 
transition to a different mode if any of the columns in the transition table evaluate to true.  In 
other words, if the “MovementControl” mode was previously Initialize and the “Safety Fuse” is 










































“Operator.”  “MovementControl” will also transfer to “Operator” if the “Safety Fuse” is still in 
the state “Safe” but now “Deadman switch” is in the state “Released” and the previous mode of 
“MovementControl” was “Computer.” 
As seen in the four transition tables, there are several statements with an asterisk in the 
OR column.  This represents a “don’t care” condition.  In the example in Figure 21, the control 
mode “doesn’t care” what the switch position is if it is not coming from the “Computer” mode.  
A separate alert and control will ensure that the switch is pressed in case it needs to be released 
again to change the “MovementControl” mode again.  
 
Figure 21.  Level 3 And/Or Table 
 
 Since the blackbox model is based only on the system’s externally visible behavior, 
inputs and outputs are other main SpecTRM-RL elements.  The input/output diagram for MAPS 
shown in Figure 13 describes the major inputs to and outputs from MAPS.  Information from this 
diagram can be used to create the Level 3 inputs and outputs for the intent specification.  Figure 
22 shows an example output from the MAPS input/output diagram.  The Move-Velocity output 
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from MAPS to the motor controller is the signal that causes the MC to begin robot motion.  
When the triggering condition shown by the AND/OR table in Figure 22 is met, the Move-
Velocity command is issued and the MC begins robot motion. 
Figure 22.  Level 3 Output Command 
 
 SpecTRM has other elements that allow the blackbox behavior to be modelled.  
Functions in SpecTRM-RL are written in an Ada-like programming script.  This script allows 
users to calculate values from system inputs.  It can be used to calculate the duration that a 
variable is valid or to calculate an exact value of a subsystem variable.  Another SpecTRM 
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element known as a macro allows users to abstract common logic and to increase readability.  A 
macro can take a piece of an AND/OR table from another part of the model and give it a name.  
This name can then be substituted for that table portion elsewhere in the model.  The macro 
definition is a single AND/OR table.  This table will evaluate to true or to false.  When the table 
is true, the macro as a whole evaluates to true where it is used in other model elements.  
Similarly, if the table is false, then the macro evaluates to false. 
 The elements of the SpecTRM blackbox include output commands, output values, modes, 
states, macros, functions, command inputs and input values.  Other information contained at 
Level 3 includes communication channels, operational procedures, user models and the results of 
performing various analyses and simulations on the blackbox model.  The blackbox model for 
MAPS can be found in Appendix A. 
 
4.3  Summary 
 
 MAPS is a case study for using system design visualizations to synthesize an intent 
specification.  The subsystem interactions with other parts of the TTPS make MAPS a good 
representative system to illustrate how visualizations describing these interactions and design 
details can be used to create an executable and analyzable model in SpecTRM.  An intent 
specification was created for the MAPS subsystem.  Rationale was captured at each level of 
development and links provide traceability throughout the entire document.  The blackbox 
system behavior was specified to allow further system level analysis and future simulation of 
MAPS together with the other subsystems that comprise the mobile robot part of the TTPS. 
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An increase in system complexity is a major obstacle for the aerospace industry, and any 
other technology driven industries.  This complexity is a result of the combination of 
implementing emerging technologies, particularly automation, and advanced industry goals.   
Software has become an integral part of complex system design, especially in spacecraft.  
Software now controls not only the spacecraft hardware, but also the onboard science and 
operations.  It was hoped that trading in the simplicity of the previously used hardware designs 
for the flexibility and abilities of software would decrease system complexity, but the reverse has 
been seen to happen.  Software can provide a solution for some design problems, however the 
lack of software integration throughout the system development process and the lack of 
understanding of the full workings of the system software have made today’s spacecraft even 
more complex. 
Returning to the hardware dependent predecessors is not a solution to this problem.  As 
space exploration goals grow more ambitious, so does the need for autonomous spacecraft 
control systems.  Artificial intelligence has not yet reached a development level where scientists 
are willing to trust spacecraft control completely in an automated system.  This means 
incorporating a human operator in the system, and increasing the complexity yet again by having 
to determine and define the human-machine relationship in the system. 
In addition to the increasing system complexity, the aerospace industry faces many other 
engineering challenges.  The diverse education and experience of multi-disciplinary system 
design teams creates a large communication problem.  Engineers working on different 
subsystems use different tools and languages to express their system needs and capabilities, with 
little overlap.  Miscommunication of key information for subsystem interfaces during the system 
design phase can lead to costly errors later in system development.  The poor usage of 
requirements and specification documentation in the system design phases also leads to system 
design problems.  These documents are typically not made available to the design engineers 
performing the detailed subsystem design, nor are they in an easily usable and readable format.  
If the documents are used, the rationale behind the decisions is often missing, making design 
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changes difficult and time consuming.  This is even more difficult if the problem is not detected 
early in the development lifecycle.  There needs to be a common medium through which 
engineers from different disciplines can communicate clearly and effectively and successfully 
analyze and execute the system level design prior to hardware manufacturing and software 
coding. 
The current economy does not allow for spacecraft system engineering to exist as it once 
did.  Budget cuts and public disinterest in space exploration have made mission funding and 
staffing much more difficult.  Where shortcuts were taken, the price was paid, and several 
successive spacecraft failures were greatly publicized.  While the budgets for these spacecraft 
were relatively low, the failed missions were still lost dollars, and resulted in a lack of public 
support for the continuation of space exploration.  The aerospace industry must now find a way 
to change its approach to spacecraft engineering in order to produce successful spacecraft and 
exploration missions under tight budget constraints. 
This thesis proposed a different approach to spacecraft system development to address 
the needs of the aerospace industry.  The approach uses system design visualizations already 
used by multi-disciplinary design teams to synthesize the requirements and specifications for the 
system.  These requirements and specifications form an intent specification that includes design 
decisions and the rationales behind them.  In this approach, subsystem designers take part in the 
requirements and specification generation, and are not just bound by them. 
The intent specification is created in a systems engineering development environment 
known as SpecTRM.  SpecTRM is a toolkit that allows users to create intent specifications that 
assist engineers in managing the system requirements, design and development process.  An 
intent specification provides more structure than a plain requirements document and makes the 
information contained more readable and accessible to project participants.  By utilizing intent 
specifications, engineers can detect specification errors early in system development so that 
changes can be made and errors fixed before leaving the design phase.  Engineers can also trace 
the design choices made in the development lifecycle and detail the rationale behind the choices 
made.  
This thesis provided an example of utilizing system design visualizations to create an 
intent specification as applied to the MAPS subsystem of the Thermal Tile Processing System.  
MAPS was chosen as the test case for evaluating this method for synthesizing intent 
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specifications because it is part of a complex system with a high level of subsystem interactions, 
and it can be modeled separately from the rest of the system for subsystem level details.   System 
design visualizations for different aspects of MAPS were created to demonstrate the use of 
visualizations in system design.  The information from those visualizations were then used to 
create a MAPS intent specification for formal analysis. 
Through applying this methodology on MAPS, it was shown how many of the problems 
outlined in Chapter 1 can be solved.  The use of SpecTRM helps to solve the problems of design 
decision traceability through the recording of rationale at every stage of development.  In 
addition, the use of SpecTRM-RL at Level 3 of the intent specification provides a readable and 
unambiguous formal specification that provides a common language with which engineers can 
easily communicate their requirements specifications.  This blackbox model of MAPS in Level 3 
of SpecTRM is based on a state machine model that does not actually require a background in 
discrete mathematics to create.  A minimal amount of training is necessary to create SpecTRM 
models that can be formally analyzed and executed. 
 An important benefit of using this approach to system design is the rigorous development 
of requirements specifications.  The intent specification created by this process can be 
thoroughly analyzed for major inconsistencies and incompleteness prior to the next development 
stage.  In addition, system functions can be easily simulated and the results of these simulations 
analyzed for deficiencies in the requirements specifications.  This enables many errors and 
inadvertent omissions to be found early in the system development lifecycle.  Errors and other 
problems found in this phase are far easier and less costly to fix than those found once 
implementation has begun.  In addition, the overall system is designed from a safety standpoint 
with a goal of eliminating hazards wherever possible, rather than having to justify the risk of a 
hazard occurring if an error is found later in the system development lifecycle. 
 The material presented here on utilizing system design visualizations to synthesize intent 
specifications demonstrates the potential for application in complex system design.  Any industry 
driven by developing technology, especially with an emphasis in adding automation to system 
implementation, can benefit from using this approach to link a formal approach to requirements 
specifications with existing system design techniques.  The results of this thesis merit further 





[1]  Casani, John.  Report on the Loss of the Mars Polar Lander and Deep Space 2 Missions.  Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory. Pasadena, CA. 22 March 2000. 
 
[2]  Dulac, Nicolas, Thomas Viguier, Nancy Leveson, and Margaret-Anne Storey.  “On the Use 
of Visualization in Formal Requirements Specification.”  Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Requirements Engineering.  Essen, Germany.  September 2002. 
 
[3]  Heimdahl, Mats P.E. and Nancy Leveson.  “Completeness and Consistency Analysis of 
State-Based Requirements.”  IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.  May 1996. 
 
[4]  International Council on Systems Engineering.  “Systems Engineering.”  Online.  4 June 
1999. 
 
[5]  Larson, Wiley J. and James R. Wertz editors.  Space Mission Analysis and Design.  Second 
Ed.  California.  Microcosm, Inc.  1992 
 
[6]  Leveson, Nancy, L. Denise Pinnel, Sean David Sandys, Suichi Koga, Jon Damon Reese. 
“Analyzing Software Specifications for Mode Confusion Potential.”  Presented at the Workshop 
on Human Error and System Development.  Glasgow.  March 1997. 
 
[7]  Leveson, Nancy.  “Completeness in Formal Specification Language Design for Process-
Control Systems.”  Proceedings of Formal Methods in Software Practice Conference.  Portland, 
OR.  August 2000. 
 
[8]  Leveson, Nancy.  “Intent Specifications:  An Approach to Building Human-Centered 
Specifications.”  IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering.  January 2000. 
 
[9]  Leveson, Nancy.  Safeware : System Safety and Computers.  Addison-Wesley Publiching 
Company Inc.  1995 
 
[10]  Leveson, Nancy.  “Shuttle Thermal Tile Processing Example Intent Specification.”  27 July 
2002. 
 
[11]  Leveson, Nancy.  “Systemic Factors in Software-Related Spacecraft Accidents.”  Space 
2001 Conference.  August 2001. 
 
[12]  Lions, J.L., et al.  Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure:  Report by the Inquiry Board.  Paris, France.  
19 July 1996. 
 
[13]  Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  The ESD Symposium Committee.  ESD Terms and 




[14]  Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  Space Systems Engineering, course 16.89.  
“Course Notes and Design Document”  Spring 2003. 
  
[15]  National Aeronautics and Space Administration.  NASA Systems Engineering Handbook.  
June 1995. 
 
[16]  Rodriguez, M., et al.  “Identifying Mode Confusion Potential in Software Design.” Digital 
Aviation Systems Conference.  October 2000. 
 
[17]  Safeware Engineering Corporation.  SpecTRM User Manual.  Version 1.0.0.  2003. 
 
[18]  Stephenson, Arthur G., et al. Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board Phase I 
Report.  10 November 1999. 
 
[19] Ulrich, Karl T. and Steven D. Eppinger.  Product Design and Development.  McGraw-Hill, 
Inc.  1995. 
 
[20]  Van Vliet, Hans.  Software Engineering Principles and Practice.  Second Ed.  New York:  
Wiley, 2001. 
 
[21] Website.  http://education.aero.org/images_ver3/n2chart.pdf 
 
[22]  Weiss, Kathryn A.  “Component-Based Systems Engineering for Autonomous Spacecraft”  
Master’s Thesis.  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA.  August 2003. 
 
[23]  Zimmerman, M.K., Kristina Lundqvist, Nancy Leveson. “Investigating the Readability of 
Formal Requirements Specifications Languages.” International Conference on Software 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Safety Policy of the Thermal Tile Processing System, and the MAPS subsytems, will be in 
accordance with the Safey Policies of the agencies that will use this system, namely NASA Dryden Flight 
Research Center or NASA Kennedy Space Center.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































MAPS is one subsytem of the Thermal Tile Processing System.  MAPS stands for Mobility and 
Positioning Subsystem and is one of the subsytems functioning on the mobile robot itself.  MAPS interacts 
directly with four other subsystems in the TTPS:
Tile Servicing Subsystem (TSS) - The TSS is responsible for directing and coordinating all tile servicing 
operations including positiong of the manipulator arm, operation of the vision subsystem and operation of 
the DMES injection system.  The TSS is also responsible for directing movement of the mobile robot to 
the correct position for tile servicing.
Motor Controller (MC) - The MC is responsible for controlling the wheels and wheel motors on the mobile 
robot.
Aural and Visual Alert Subsystem (AS) - The AS is responsible for providing movement warnings to any 
humans in the area of the mobile robot during movement and operations.
System Log (SL) - The SL maintains a log of data and information recorded during TTPS operations for 
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A review board that is independent of the development team verifies levels 1, 2 and 3 of MAPS.  Multiple 
iterations of this review process can be performed to help ensure that the analysis reflects the actual 
operation of the system.  Suggestions for improvement are added as necessary and evaluated in the next 
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Level 3: Blackbox Behavior
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